A Korean Peninsula Policy That Does Not Wait for Miracles

The Korean Peninsula needs a policy that does not simply wait for a miracle, the article argues, as the assumptions behind unification, denuclearization and the U.S.-South Korean alliance have all come under pressure.

The author compares today’s situation with the Berlin Wall. East Germany built the wall in 1961 to seal off West Berlin, creating a symbol of division and repression. Yet the American diplomat and economist John Kenneth Galbraith called it a “pillar of détente,” arguing that it helped preserve peace. After the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, Washington moved toward managing the Cold War by accepting the division of Germany as a frozen reality.

A similar debate emerged in West Germany. Egon Bahr argued that West Germany had to negotiate with the hostile East German regime and pursue “change through rapprochement” to reduce the suffering and costs of division. This approach eventually displaced Konrad Adenauer’s policy of seeking to change the status quo through strength, which increasingly conflicted with the Western policy of détente.

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I think the wall is a good thing. In any event, peace is being maintained because of it.

The article says North Korea is now turning the Military Demarcation Line into a practical border. It has installed fences and barriers and laid mines, creating a permanent defensive fortification. Pyongyang’s abandonment of revolutionary goals in the South and unification, the author says, is alarming because it is hostile, but it also represents a choice to preserve the status quo.

Conditions for denuclearization have also deteriorated. Russia calls the North Korean nuclear issue closed and openly supports Pyongyang, while China largely remains silent. U.S. President Donald Trump has also sent what the article describes as conciliatory signals, including remarks about getting along with North Korea despite its “57 powerful nuclear weapons.” The sudden reduction of a planned U.S.-South Korean exercise, reportedly after Trump’s words on its opening day, has further raised doubts about America’s defense commitment.

The article views President Lee Jae Myung’s emphasis on freezing North Korea’s nuclear program first as a more realistic phased approach. But it says even a freeze will require a concrete strategy capable of persuading North Korea to halt fissile-material production and nuclear-warhead expansion. South Korea, it argues, must also prepare to bear almost full responsibility for conventional deterrence as the United States changes. The author closes by invoking Bahr’s question: “What kind of policy is that?” if it merely waits for a miracle.

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What kind of policy is that?