[Editorial] Another Extreme Standoff... Reduce the Judiciary Committee's Power and Legalize Chairperson Allocation

The South Korean National Assembly is mired in extreme confrontation between the ruling People Power Party and the main opposition Democratic Party over the selection of standing committee chairpersons for the second half of the 22nd Assembly. The Democratic Party, having already decided on chairpersons for 11 out of 18 committees, has announced plans to convene the July extraordinary session, even if unilaterally. In response, the People Power Party has decided to completely boycott the standing committee schedule.

This recurring conflict during the formation of parliamentary committees, similar to the 21st National Assembly, has led to parliamentary paralysis. The core of the dispute this time, as in previous instances, is the allocation of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee chairpersonship. Since 2004, it has been customary for the second-largest party to hold this position, serving as a check and balance, especially when the largest party holds the Speaker of the National Assembly role. However, this convention was broken in 2020 when the Democratic Party, then the largest party, also took the Legislation and Judiciary Committee chairmanship. Since then, the parties have been locked in a two-year cycle of contention, holding the nation's welfare hostage over this position.

The reason for the intense focus on the Legislation and Judiciary Committee chairpersonship lies in its excessive authority. Historically, this committee has wielded its "systematic and substantive review" power like an "all-purpose sword," scrutinizing bills for unconstitutional clauses or conflicts with other laws. It has also been used to block legislation based on political advantage or even alter bill content, leading to constitutional debates. This power, originally granted in the 1950s when most lawmakers were unfamiliar with legal texts, was intended as a technical measure to improve bill quality, not a political one to emulate a senate.

The article argues that if this power is being misused and is merely fueling extreme partisan conflict, it should be curtailed immediately. With a growing number of lawmakers being legal experts, there is little justification for the Legislation and Judiciary Committee to retain exclusive control over systematic and substantive review. The U.S., for example, has a separate legislative reference service. Alternatively, review authority could be distributed among all standing committees. Furthermore, codifying the distribution of committee chairmanships into law could prevent future gridlock. While previously handled through negotiation based on party strength, the current lack of persuasion, compromise, and respect makes such agreements unlikely. Amending the National Assembly Act to automatically allocate chairmanships based on party seat numbers and allow parties to choose sequentially could at least prevent wasteful parliamentary disruptions.