Europe remained neutral, UN preserved status quo, US fumbled. Nothing guaranteed Croatia's victory

In 1995, the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape preceding Operation Storm was defined by significant challenges. Europe proved incapable of meaningfully influencing the conclusion of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Simultaneously, the US administration navigated a period of indecision and missteps, while United Nations missions in both nations proved largely ineffective.

Amidst this complex environment, the leadership of rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, specifically the RS and RSK entities, were actively planning and announcing the formation of a joint constitution and unification. This included aspirations for unification with Serbia, then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Contrary to the widely held, often simplified, public perception that Operation Storm was a quick and easy victory against a significantly weaker opponent, historical analysis suggests these interpretations are hasty and imprecise. The geopolitical and geostrategic situation in southeastern Europe during the first half of 1995 was exceptionally intricate. At that specific moment, there was no guarantee of a certain victory for the Croatian Army, let alone the subsequent diplomatic and judicial triumphs that materialized much later.

Commenters on the article offered differing perspectives. One user suggested that Europe and the US had a plan from the outset to divide Yugoslavia using "soft power." Another countered that Europe was not neutral, citing an arms embargo against Croatia, and argued that the US was not wandering but had its own plan, Z4, which they deemed detrimental to Croatia.