IAEA inspections in Iran need to be fundamentally different after Iran was bombed - analysis
Summarized and contextualized by DistantNews.
At a glance
- IAEA inspections in Iran will be fundamentally different following the bombing of its nuclear sites in June 2025.
- The focus will shift from monitoring existing programs to assessing remaining components and preventing their rejuvenation.
- A key task will be retrieving and diluting Iran's stockpiled 60% and 20% enriched uranium, a complex process that may limit inspectors' long-term role.
The ongoing public exchange between US President Donald Trump and Iran's negotiating team regarding the extent of IAEA nuclear inspections overlooks a critical shift: the sites themselves have been bombed. Access for inspectors will not be the same as it was before the June 2025 strikes.
From 2015 to June 2025, Iran operated three major nuclear enrichment facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, housing a large number of centrifuges and materials. While dozens of smaller sites also existed, the primary mission for IAEA inspectors involved monitoring enrichment and the installation of new centrifuges at these top three locations. The current inspection mission, however, will be radically different because these key sites have been bombed, leaving potentially zero or close to zero centrifuges to monitor.
Consequently, the mission will focus less on an existing nuclear program and more on cataloging what components of the program still function and ensuring they are not restarted or that new facilities are not established. A central initial task for the IAEA will be retrieving and either removing or monitoring the dilution of over 400 kilograms of Iran's high-level 60% enriched uranium, which has been buried under the rubble of the main nuclear sites for about a year. The disposal or dilution of the regime's 20% enriched uranium will also be critical.
Retrieving and disposing of the 60% enriched uranium is expected to take weeks, if not months, requiring specialized equipment and protective gear. This complex task may be unprecedented for the IAEA. Once completed, it will not be a continuous operation. Similarly, locating and disposing of the 20% enriched uranium is also likely a time-limited task, potentially lasting weeks or months. This suggests that within months of Iran granting access for uranium retrieval, many IAEA inspectors might depart as their work diminishes.
Originally published by Jerusalem Post. Summarized and contextualized by our editorial team with added local perspective. Read our editorial standards.