Iran’s oil gamble could turn Gulf attrition into Tehran’s own nightmare - opinion

Iran has adopted a strategy of sustained, low-intensity conflict in the Gulf, employing ballistic missiles, drones, and scattered strikes on energy facilities and military targets. This calibrated escalation aims to generate disruption without triggering all-out war, betting on gradually exhausting adversaries and maintaining permanent anxiety in energy and financial markets to pressure de-escalation.

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Can Iran turn the Gulf into a long attrition arena without itself becoming the most attrited party?

However, this approach harbors a dangerous contradiction: while Iran leverages the "oil card" against the Gulf and the West, its own economy critically depends on the continued sale of its oil. China is Iran's most significant customer, accounting for a substantial portion of its seaborne crude exports. Independent Chinese refineries have built profitability around discounted Iranian crude, making Tehran reliant on this single-buyer dependence for hard currency.

This reliance creates a serious structural fragility. Any prolonged disruption to Iran's oil exports would pose a direct threat to its economy's ability to function. Large-scale strikes on export terminals could trigger a supply crisis and financial pressure not only on Tehran but also on the refineries that depend on its discounted oil.

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The truth, the part less present in public discussion, is that the most important customer for Iranian oil is not the West but China.

The logic of war suggests that a party legitimizing attacks on adversaries' energy infrastructure risks having its own facilities targeted. Iran's strategy of targeting Gulf energy facilities could ultimately alter the rules of engagement, making its own oil infrastructure vulnerable. This reality, the author argues, is often absent from what is described as "hysterical Iranian propaganda discourse."

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The party that legitimizes the targeting of its adversaries’ oil infrastructure gradually loses the political, moral, and even operational capacity to object when its own oil facilities become part of the target bank.