Iran: The Generals' Rule After Khamenei's Assassination
Translated from Arabic, summarized and contextualized by DistantNews.
At a glance
- The assassination of Ali Khamenei revealed a shift in Iranian power, with security and military networks now holding de facto control over the state.
- This power structure, forged during the Iran-Iraq War, operates behind a political and religious facade, managing decision-making away from traditional institutions.
- Prominent figures like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Ahmad Vahidi exemplify this new, intertwined security-state apparatus, which ensures regime continuity despite internal and external pressures.
The recent assassination of Ali Khamenei has undeniably exposed a fundamental truth about the Islamic Republic that has been brewing for decades: the true locus of power has shifted away from the clerical establishment and firmly into the hands of the security and military apparatus. Western reports have increasingly highlighted this reality, describing a tight-knit circle of Revolutionary Guard-affiliated leaders who effectively steer the nation's course, often from behind the scenes.
The assassination of Ali Khamenei was not just a security incident in the history of the Islamic Republic, but a revealing moment of a deep transformation that had been taking shape within the structure of the Iranian system for decades.
This transformation is not a sudden development but a consequence of the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that shaped the political and military consciousness of a generation of Revolutionary Guard commanders. It was during this period that a mindset of perpetual suspicion towards the outside world and a belief in security-first governance took root. Consequently, former military leaders transitioned seamlessly into roles within intelligence, parliament, the judiciary, economy, and media, solidifying the military's grip on state functions.
What we are witnessing today is the Islamic Republic no longer operating under the singular authority of a Supreme Leader, even if that image is maintained for constitutional and symbolic reasons. Khamenei's assassination did not plunge the nation into political chaos because real power is distributed within a cohesive network of security and military institutions. This network possesses the inherent capability to regenerate itself, ensuring the state's survival even amidst severe blows, such as the recent assassinations and ongoing sanctions.
The question that arose immediately after his killing was not only about who would succeed him, but who actually rules Iran, and whether the religious establishment is still the center of real decision-making, or if power has gradually shifted to a security-military network that manages the state from behind the political and religious facade.
Within this intricate structure, figures like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the current Parliament speaker, stand out. He embodies the fusion of military influence and political experience, having previously led the Revolutionary Guard's air force, the police, and Tehran's municipality. While Ghalibaf presents himself as a pragmatic conservative, his history reveals a security-oriented individual shaped by the Revolutionary Guard's ethos. He has openly boasted about his role in suppressing student protests in 1999, deploying forces to quell demonstrations.
In Western reports, it became clear that Tehran had entered a new phase different from the traditional image that has accompanied the Islamic Republic since 1979.
Alongside Ghalibaf is Ahmad Vahidi, one of Iran's most hardline generals, who assumed command of the Revolutionary Guard after his predecessor's death. Vahidi is more than a military leader; he has been a key architect of Iran's regional influence for years, having led the Quds Force in its early stages and contributing to the development of Tehran's proxy networks. His name has also been linked to Western accusations of operations targeting American and Jewish interests abroad, claims that Tehran consistently denies. Internally, figures such as the head of the judiciary, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and the powerful intelligence operative, Hossein Taeb, exemplify the nature of the new state emerging in Iranโa state where security, judiciary, and politics are not separate but intertwined tools serving a singular objective: the preservation of the regime. Thus, the judiciary has transformed from a mere legal institution into an integral part of the political and social control system, while intelligence operations have become central to governance.
This group did not emerge suddenly, but was formed during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, a war that shaped the political and military consciousness of a whole generation of Revolutionary Guard leaders.
Originally published by Hespress in Arabic. Translated, summarized, and contextualized by our editorial team with added local perspective. Read our editorial standards.