Israel’s battle for global consciousness: Why the Sparta doctrine harms national security - opinion
Summarized and contextualized by DistantNews.
At a glance
- Israel's national security doctrine, based on deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory, is being debated for its validity after the October 7 attacks.
- Some argue the doctrine is outdated against non-state actors with ideological motivations, while others believe Israel failed to adhere to its principles.
- A third perspective suggests adding defense and preemption to the existing doctrine, but the author argues national security must also encompass the battle for global consciousness and Israel's international standing.
Israel's long-standing national security doctrine, established by David Ben-Gurion in the 1950s, relies on three core pillars: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. Deterrence aims to convince adversaries that attacking Israel is futile. If deterrence fails, intelligence is expected to provide sufficient warning for mobilization, allowing for a small standing army during peacetime. Decisive victory seeks swift, unequivocal wins, shifting conflict to enemy territory to restore deterrence and provide time for Israel to strengthen between wars.
deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory
However, the efficacy of this doctrine in the wake of the October 7 attacks is under intense scrutiny. Critics argue that Hamas was not deterred, intelligence failed to provide adequate warning, and Israel did not achieve a swift, decisive victory. They contend that this failure is due to a changed reality, where enemies are often ideological terrorist organizations whose motivations defy conventional calculations. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict arena has evolved, with threats no longer confined to immediate borders.
Hamas was not deterred, intelligence failed to provide warning, and Israel did not achieve a swift, decisive victory.
Conversely, some maintain that the classical doctrine remains sound but that Israel's own overconfidence led to its neglect. This viewpoint suggests that Israel assumed deterrence existed without actively cultivating it, dismissed warning signs, and opted for "managing the conflict" rather than pursuing decisive victory. Proponents of this view advocate for a return to Ben-Gurion's principles with renewed resolve.
We did not create deterrence – we simply assumed it existed, and we were wrong. We dismissed warning signs that were, in fact, there. And for years, we abandoned the pursuit of decisive victory in favor of “managing the conflict” and “quiet in return for quiet.”
A third approach proposes augmenting the classical doctrine with two additional elements: defense, enabling Israel to withstand surprise attacks if deterrence and warning systems fail, and preemption, allowing for the proactive elimination of emerging threats. The author, however, contends that this debate is too narrowly focused. True national security, they argue, must extend beyond confronting physical warfare to include the critical battle for global consciousness, the narratives and perceptions through which Israel is understood internationally. Israel's standing in the international arena, therefore, is as crucial as its border defense.
defense – the ability to withstand a surprise attack if deterrence and advance warning fail – and preemption – taking the initiative to eliminate emerging threats before they fully ripen.
Originally published by Jerusalem Post. Summarized and contextualized by our editorial team with added local perspective. Read our editorial standards.