Israel’s Syria strategy risks turning Turkey into new Iran - opinion

Israel's security doctrine in Syria is primarily guided by its effect on freedom of aerial movement, rather than the political or legal nature of a presence. This doctrine leads Israel to employ the same military tactics against both Iranian militias and Turkish state-backed operations, raising questions about its strategic approach.

The core issue lies in how Israel perceives threats. A conventional radar operated by a NATO member, like Turkey, is seen to restrict Israeli aircraft as much as a shoulder-fired missile from an armed group. This perspective equates legitimate state partnerships with illegitimate infiltration, leading to actions like bombing Syrian airfields that Turkey is helping to repair. Such strikes, occurring before a capability is fully established, risk undermining deterrence and alienating potential partners.

The article suggests that Israel's response to Turkey's presence in Syria, which differs fundamentally from Iran's approach, is misguided. While Iran sought to penetrate the Syrian state through militias, Turkey is engaged in a state-to-state partnership, providing air cover and training for a new Syrian army. This partnership requires the Syrian state's existence, unlike Iran's project which aimed to supersede it.

By treating Turkey's influence project – which includes securing strategic depth, addressing the Kurdish question, and promoting its defense industry – with the same military tools used against Iran, Israel risks turning a potential partner into a new adversary. The author posits that this approach, driven by a narrow interpretation of security threats based on aerial movement, overlooks the complex geopolitical dynamics at play and could have significant unintended consequences for regional stability.