Patrick Honohan: Why Anglo bankers were never sanctioned like those at INBS

The collapse of Ireland's banking sector during the financial crisis, which cost the state an estimated €37 billion, warrants a closer look at accountability, particularly concerning the former executives of Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) and Anglo Irish Bank. These institutions, along with others, failed due to reckless lending to property developers and required substantial state support, including a broad bank guarantee and the establishment of Nama to manage toxic loans.

Nama, tasked with managing the vast portfolio of property loans, successfully disposed of most assets, even generating a profit. While some criticized the speed of asset sales, potentially missing out on further gains as property prices rose, the article suggests external pressures, such as from the ECB, were not the primary driver for rapid disposals. Less than 8 percent of Nama's receipts came from sales during the Troika program.

The narrative contrasts the Irish situation with the US, noting that financial engineering did not cause the Irish banks' downfall. However, the exit strategy involved its own complex financial instruments, like asset-backed bonds, which facilitated Nama's acquisition of loans. The article implicitly raises questions about why Michael Fingleton, former CEO of INBS, did not face the same level of sanction as some of his counterparts, especially given the significant cost to the public purse.