Preserving Israel’s military edge: Strategic steps for the MOD - opinion

The enduring US-Israel special relationship, a cornerstone of regional stability, faces new challenges in maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). Forged in the 1960s and codified in US law, the commitment to Israel's QME is paramount, especially in the volatile Middle East.

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Central to this alliance is the United States’ statutory commitment, codified in Section 36(h) of the Arms Export Control Act, to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) vis-à-vis its adversaries.

Recent geopolitical shifts, including the aftermath of the October 7th terror attacks, potential Saudi-Israeli normalization, and evolving US public opinion, underscore the critical need to preserve Israel's military superiority. The proposed sale of advanced F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, while not an immediate threat, highlights the long-term risks of proliferation and the potential exposure of sensitive US and Israeli-modified technology to adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran.

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Key dynamics in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, terror attacks include potential Saudi-Israeli normalization and the expansion of the Abraham Accords, renewed warmth in US-Turkey relations, and the erosion of American public support for Israel.

From an Israeli perspective, history teaches us to prioritize acquiring the capabilities to maintain QME, irrespective of the current disposition of regional regimes. This proactive approach is essential to safeguarding national interests and ensuring Israel's security in a rapidly changing landscape. The article's recommendations aim to align QME preservation with broader national interests, addressing strategic risks posed by evolving Middle East balances.

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In general, advanced arms transfers by the US to regional powers pose dual risks: Direct threats to the State of Israel and Israel Defense Forces operating across the region, as well as exposure of sensitive US technology (and Israeli-modified US technology) to peer competitors, such as Russia and China; and to Iran.