The National Election Commission, Favored by the Constitution, Its Predetermined Betrayal [Park Yong-hyun Column]

South Korea's National Election Commission (NEC) enjoys a level of constitutional independence rarely seen globally, a status born from the nation's painful history of electoral fraud, particularly the rigged 1960 election under the Syngman Rhee regime. While many democracies manage elections through their executive branches or establish election commissions at the legislative level, South Korea's NEC is enshrined as an independent constitutional organ, a status shared by only a handful of countries like the Philippines, India, and El Salvador.

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There are few countries where the status of the election commission is as high and solid as in South Korea. In traditional democratic countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the executive branch actually manages elections. Countries that transitioned to democracy relatively late often establish election commissions as institutions independent of the executive branch. However, in most of these countries, election commissions are stipulated at the 'statutory' level only.

This elevated status was reinforced over decades, particularly after the democratic reforms of 1987, which restored direct presidential elections. The NEC was intended to be a bulwark of fair participation. However, the article argues that this constitutional protection has paradoxically allowed the NEC to become an insular institution, shielded from external scrutiny and accountability. The recent incident involving ballot shortages during the June local elections is cited as a prime example of the NEC's "lax organizational discipline and public service ethics."

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The NEC, which was conceived through the painful history of the March 15th fraudulent election and stood tall as an independent constitutional organ through arduous democratization, has now degenerated into a dysfunctional institution that infringes upon the people's right to participate in elections and a corrupt institution steeped in privilege.

The author contends that the NEC's independence, intended to ensure fairness, has instead fostered a sense of entitlement and privilege. The Constitutional Court's ruling that the NEC is not subject to the Board of Audit and Inspection's oversight further entrenches this isolation. Without external checks and balances, the NEC's adherence to its mission relies solely on its internal sense of duty, which the article suggests has eroded over the past four decades, transforming into a "sense of privilege."

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The reason for this is that the NEC has enjoyed its authority behind the shield of being an independent constitutional organ, without any external checks or controls.

This situation raises critical constitutional questions about public control over independent state bodies. The article draws a parallel with the judiciary, another institution granted significant independence by the constitution to ensure fair trials. However, like the NEC, the judiciary has also faced criticism for becoming detached and unaccountable, as seen in past "judicial-bureaucracy" scandals and the handling of disciplinary actions against judges involved in financial misconduct. The author concludes that South Korea's constitution, while aiming for fairness through independence, must now evolve to incorporate robust mechanisms for accountability and public oversight to prevent such independent bodies from betraying their core mandates.

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Therefore, the recent ballot shortage incident poses a task of thorough reform of the election management system, along with an important constitutional question: How should public control be exercised over state institutions that are not elected by the people but are granted independence, and how should they be held accountable?