Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Hezbollah's "support war" for Hamas, initiated in late 2023, dismantled the doctrine of deterrence that the Iranian-backed group had meticulously cultivated for nearly two decades in its confrontation with Israel. This assumption, which proved to be a significant miscalculation, was inadvertently reinforced by Israel's own approach in the preceding year.

The subsequent round of fighting in 2026 presented both sides with an opportunity to redefine the rules of engagement. Israel, rather than rushing into direct conflict after Hezbollah's initial wave of largely "performative" attacks, including rockets fired at the Shebaa Farms, quietly steered the confrontation. This strategy involved notable restraint and considerable strategic calculation, including diplomatic efforts through Washington aimed at separating the Lebanese front from the Palestinian one.

Despite proposals, including one from then-US envoy Amos Hochstein in July 2024 offering a political victory to Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah if operations ceased, the group rejected the terms. Nasrallah reportedly stated that the war in Gaza had to end first. This marked another strategic misjudgment by Hezbollah, as the unfolding conflict in Lebanon's border villages quickly revealed Israel's distinct technological and military superiority.

Previously, Hezbollah fighters could launch rockets and depart before Israeli aircraft arrived. However, in the new conflict, the window between launch and retaliation narrowed to mere seconds, turning each launch into a near-suicidal operation. Israel's advantage was further underscored by precise assassinations of Hezbollah commanders, including a strike that eliminated much of the elite Radwan Force, followed by the elimination of Hezbollah's military commander and the "pager operation" that incapacitated thousands of operatives.