Election Commission Reform Must Be Thorough, Open to Constitutional Changes

Following a significant "ballot paper shortage" incident during the recent June 3 local elections, the Democratic Party convened a forum to address the systemic failures of the Election Management Commission (NEC). Experts gathered to propose reforms aimed at restoring public trust in the electoral process. The ruling party and the opposition are scheduled to meet to discuss a plan for a special parliamentary investigation into the matter, signaling a commitment to thorough reform.

Participants at the forum stressed that the NEC's shortcomings were not merely administrative errors but stemmed from a "malformed organizational structure" and a "lack of legal control mechanisms." A key concern is the NEC's dual structure, which separates decision-making by non-standing commissioners, often judges, from the operational execution by the secretariat, composed of civil servants. This division reportedly hinders effective on-site command and control, as well as swift post-incident responses.

“

This situation is not a simple administrative error by front-line staff, but an inevitable result of a 'malformed organizational structure' and 'lack of legal control mechanisms.'

Unlike election management bodies in many major democracies, the NEC has operated with considerable autonomy since its inception in 1963, largely free from external scrutiny. In contrast, France's elections are managed by the Interior Ministry and audited by the Court of Auditors, while Germany's Federal Returning Officer, a role held concurrently by the head of the Federal Statistical Office, is subject to audit by the Federal Court of Auditors.

Various reform proposals are now on the table, including making the NEC chairperson a standing position and transferring ballot and vote-counting duties to local governments. Some suggest establishing an independent audit body within the NEC or amending the Board of Audit and Inspection Act to allow for direct oversight. However, given the Constitutional Court's previous ruling deeming the Board of Audit and Inspection's oversight of the NEC unconstitutional, some argue that constitutional revision may be necessary to ensure a robust and legally sound reform of the commission. The urgency lies in finding a balanced approach that upholds the NEC's independence while significantly enhancing its accountability and operational capabilities.

“

The NEC has been consistently outside the scope of external monitoring and checks since its establishment in 1963, citing its status as an 'independent constitutional body.' This is rare in major democratic countries worldwide.