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For Israel, peace with Saudi Arabia is not worth a nuclear arms race in the Middle East - opinion

From Jerusalem Post · () English

Summarized and contextualized by DistantNews.

At a glance

Opinion Sources not specified Context piece
  • Saudi Arabia's potential normalization with Israel via the Abraham Accords could significantly reshape the Middle East.
  • However, allowing Saudi Arabia to develop independent uranium enrichment capabilities poses a critical security risk.
  • Israel must not accept this condition for normalization, as enrichment technology can be diverted for nuclear weapons, creating a dangerous precedent in the region.

Saudi Arabia's potential accession to the Abraham Accords represents a historic opportunity for Israel, promising to reshape the Middle East by integrating the influential kingdom into regional diplomacy. Such a move could unlock new trade routes, bolster a moderate bloc against Iran, and grant Israel unprecedented legitimacy. Yet, this significant diplomatic achievement comes with a potentially perilous condition: Saudi Arabia's pursuit of an independent uranium enrichment capability.

Allowing Saudi Arabia to develop an independent uranium enrichment capability should set off alarm bells in Jerusalem.

โ€” David Ben-BasaThe author highlights the primary security concern regarding the potential normalization deal.

According to Reuters, the proposed agreement might not mandate Saudi Arabia's adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agencyโ€™s Additional Protocol, which allows for more rigorous inspections. This contrasts sharply with the U.S.-UAE agreement, where Abu Dhabi renounced uranium enrichment. While Saudi Arabia's stated goal of building nuclear reactors for energy production aligns with its Vision 2030 diversification plans, the necessity of enrichment technology for civilian power plants is questionable. Nuclear fuel can be readily purchased from international suppliers, as many nations do.

The distinction between a civilian nuclear reactor and an independent enrichment capability is critical.

โ€” David Ben-BasaThe author explains the dual-use nature of uranium enrichment technology.

The critical distinction lies between operating civilian reactors and possessing independent enrichment capabilities. The technology used for low-level uranium enrichment, while necessary for power plants, can also be repurposed to advance the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons if a political decision is made. This raises serious concerns, especially given Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's public statement that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran obtains them.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will also need to acquire one.

โ€” David Ben-BasaThe author cites the Saudi Crown Prince's statement as evidence of the kingdom's nuclear ambitions.

Allowing Saudi Arabia to develop such sensitive technology, particularly after efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, would be difficult to justify. Israel's security policy cannot hinge on the current leadership in Riyadh, as regimes and alliances inevitably shift. Furthermore, granting this capability to Saudi Arabia could trigger a dangerous domino effect, encouraging other Middle Eastern nations to pursue similar nuclear ambitions and destabilizing the region further.

If the US allows one Mideast country to enrich uranium, whatโ€™s stopping others from aiming to achieve this as well?

โ€” David Ben-BasaThe author raises concerns about the potential proliferation of nuclear technology in the region.
DistantNews Editorial

Originally published by Jerusalem Post. Summarized and contextualized by our editorial team with added local perspective. Read our editorial standards.