How the SCO chips away at US power without an alliance system

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation began 25 years ago as a modest arrangement for managing borders between China, Russia and four Central Asian states. At its anniversary summit in Bishkek, it presents a much harder proposition for the United States to dismiss.

The organisation now includes China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, most Central Asian republics and Belarus. Turkey and several Gulf states participate as partners. Its 10 full members represent more than 3.4 billion people and roughly a quarter of the world economy.

The timing gives the grouping added weight. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains unresolved, while the war between Iran and the United States has made the Persian Gulf another arena of strategic competition. Energy markets face renewed exposure to disruption around the Strait of Hormuz.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged the SCO to take on a larger role in technology and security and to help build a “universally secure environment”. He describes the organisation as a model for cooperation without formal alliances, confrontation or targeting third parties, with an emphasis on development, security, people’s well-being and dialogue.

That does not make the SCO an anti-American alliance. India and China remain strategic competitors, India and Pakistan have longstanding tensions, and Central Asian governments seek room to manoeuvre among Moscow, Beijing, Ankara, Brussels and Washington. Turkey is still a NATO member while pursuing a broader Eurasian role.

The SCO has neither NATO’s military command nor the European Union’s supranational institutions. Its practical value lies elsewhere: it gives governments that do not want Washington to define their foreign policy a place to coordinate, negotiate and hedge.

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universally secure environment