Indonesia: Is High Political Cost Driving Regional Corruption?

Recent arrests of regional heads by Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) have reignited debate on tackling corruption at the local level. In response, a proposal has emerged to increase the financial welfare of regional leaders, suggesting incentives like a percentage of local revenue could boost performance and deter corruption.

This idea, supported by figures like the Minister of Home Affairs, Tito Karnavian, posits that the high costs associated with winning elections for regional leadership contribute to corrupt practices. The proposed solution aims to make the official income more commensurate with the perceived expenses, thereby reducing the temptation for illicit gains.

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The public policy should not be built on vague assumptions about 'political costs,' especially when the costs in question originate from practices outside the legal framework. Instead of solving the root problem, the proposal risks shifting focus from reforming the governance of political financing to providing compensation for distortions that should be eradicated.

However, critics argue that this logic is problematic. They contend that basing public policy on vague assumptions about "political costs," especially those derived from illegal practices, is misguided. Instead of addressing the root cause, which they identify as the distorted mechanisms of political financing, this proposal risks merely compensating for illegal activities rather than eradicating them. The argument is that raising salaries does not tackle the fundamental issue of "political mahar" (fees for candidacy) and vote-buying, which are seen as integral to winning elections.

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The statement by the Minister of Home Affairs that becoming a regional head requires large costs can be accepted: the process of candidacy and winning in regional elections is indeed not free.