Judicial Reform Politicization Threatens Venezuela's TSJ Reform, Analyst Warns

A partial reform of Venezuela's Organic Law of the Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) has been approved by the National Assembly, a move political scientist Walter Molina describes as a crucial step toward "re-institutionalization" and a potential transition to a new political era. Molina emphasizes that restructuring the highest court is indispensable for ensuring legal certainty and institutional stability, especially in anticipation of future electoral processes.

The core of the reform lies in adjusting the composition of the Judicial Nominations Committee. Previously comprising 21 members, it will now have 23. The modification significantly increases the representation of civil society sectors to 12 members, while the quota for parliamentarians remains at 11 deputies. Although non-governmental organizations have consistently argued against legislators serving on this advisory body, the amendment aims to shift the power balance during the preliminary evaluation phase of judicial candidates.

Molina cautions that the true equilibrium of power within this new structure depends entirely on the independence and suitability of the representatives selected from civil society. "The only way to have a real balance of power is if the 12 members from civil society are correct and honorable people. People who we know will be there to try to choose magistrates who have the credentials to be magistrates in Venezuela," he stated.

This reform is considered a prerequisite for the renewal of the National Electoral Council (CNE). Molina warns that a judiciary controlled by the ruling party could nullify any electoral process, a scenario that has occurred in previous years. He highlights the risk of a "fictional civil society," where the ruling party (PSUV) might present ostensibly independent profiles that are, in reality, aligned with its interests to maintain institutional hegemony.

The reform's long-term impact is significant, as newly elected magistrates will serve 12-year terms, potentially spanning the initial governments of a future democratic stage. Molina's analysis underscores that an independent judiciary is essential for reviewing restrictive measures, releasing political prisoners, and restoring rights to those disqualified from holding office. The success of this reform hinges on genuine independence, not just a reshuffling of power dynamics.

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The only way to have a real balance of power is if the 12 members from civil society are correct and honorable people. People who we know will be there to try to choose magistrates who have the credentials to be magistrates in Venezuela.