Outsourcing security

Maulana Fazlur Rehman's recent criticism of an unspecified state policy to arm private militias for local protection against terrorists has ignited controversy. Critics accuse the maulana of disrespecting those who have sacrificed their lives for national security. However, his remarks highlight a broader, complex issue: why states in conflict zones encourage local populations to form self-defense groups.

Pakistan has repeatedly employed this tactic across various regions, including its former Fata and Pata areas, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The core question, potentially at the heart of the maulana's argument, is the consistent failure of these policies. His choice of platform near Lahore, Punjab's political center, suggests a deliberate attempt to reach key decision-makers. His objections are not isolated; in KP and Balochistan, particularly in southern districts, locals are forming self-defense militias against groups like the banned TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur's faction. Tribal elders and political leaders have voiced strong criticism of state security failures, as evidenced by recent protests in Quetta by families of slain police personnel.

While some local private militias have indeed been formed by criminal elements seeking state patronage, the broader phenomenon of state-backed armed groups, known by various names like 'amn (peace) committees' and 'lashkars,' or pejoratively as 'death squads,' has lost favor. This shift is evident across both KP and Balochistan for distinct reasons. The reliance on local militias in KP has historical roots in the British colonial model of collective responsibility. During the peak of counterterrorism operations from 2007 to 2015, the state revived this approach, arming tens of thousands of anti-Taliban lashkar members with full support from civilian and security leadership. President Asif Ali Zardari reportedly favored this strategy, with suggestions of a deal for Chinese small arms to equip KP's peace committees, possibly driven by the personal tragedy of his wife Benazir Bhutto's assassination.

Conceptually modeled after the US-backed 'Sunni awakening' against Al Qaeda in Iraq, the policy initially gained traction in former Fata and Pata regions, supported by state funding, arms, and institutional backing. In its early stages, these militias provided vital local intelligence and acted as a protective shield for the state. However, the model quickly revealed its inherent flaws, leading to its current unpopularity.