Plenković's Move on Diaspora Votes Aims to Damage Milanović's Image, Analyst Claims

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković has announced the government's readiness to amend constitutional restrictions that limit diaspora representation in parliament to three mandates. However, he immediately stated that such a change would be impossible to implement due to a lack of support from the left-wing opposition.

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Now this has become topical again because if you have both Croatian and BiH citizenship, the question is whether both countries can call you up for military service.

Political analyst Žarko Puhovski interprets Plenković's initiative as a strategic move designed to undermine the image of President Zoran Milanović, who maintains influence over the left-liberal opposition. Puhovski believes Plenković's primary goal was to damage Milanović's reputation, particularly concerning the current three-representative limit for the diaspora in the Sabor (parliament), which Plenković attributes to Milanović's alleged "blackmail" tactics.

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Why did the prime minister even bring up this topic then? Because he wants to damage Zoran Milanović's image, who still controls the left-liberal opposition.

Puhovski suggests that Plenković is aware that no constitutional changes are feasible at this moment but felt it was important to raise the issue to tarnish Milanović's image. He speculates that Plenković might be anticipating Milanović's potential candidacy in future parliamentary elections and is attempting to neutralize him preemptively. Puhovski notes that without Milanović leading a unified list of parties like Možemo and SDP, they would have little chance of success, provided Milanović behaves constitutionally and resigns from the presidency before the elections.

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I am convinced that Plenković is certainly counting on Milanović's candidacy, whether he fears it is a question of his personal stance.

The discussion also delves into the broader issue of voting rights for citizens living abroad who do not pay taxes in Croatia. Puhovski dismisses the argument that such individuals should not have voting rights, comparing it to outdated property-based democracy. He references a 1963 Council of Europe convention on combating dual or multiple citizenship, suggesting that while outright abolition may be difficult, an agreement could be reached. This agreement could require individuals with dual citizenship, particularly those living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to choose whether to vote in the Bosnian parliament, the Croatian Sabor, or the Serbian Assembly, as the current system grants Croats and Serbs two votes while Bosniaks have only one. The issue of dual military service obligations for those with Croatian and BiH citizenship has also resurfaced.

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Should those who do not live in Croatia and do not pay taxes here even have the right to vote?