Taiwan Must Build Its Own Strength, Not Rely on U.S. Promises

A U.S. think tank's warning about Beijing's attempts to exploit the transactional nature of the Trump administration's Taiwan policy serves as a stark reminder for Taiwan to recognize China's gray-zone maneuvers. The warning, from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, suggests Beijing aims to chip away at Washington's rules for handling Taiwan without firing a shot.

Historically, U.S. "strategic ambiguity" was rooted in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait and protecting American interests. However, Beijing is likely to view "transactional ambiguity" under Trump as an opportunity. It may twist arms sales, security cooperation, and political statements into bargaining chips for negotiations with China. Beijing could even claim that U.S. support for Taiwan is negotiable or subject to discounts.

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The U.S. think tank's warning highlights Beijing's gray-zone tactics, which include normalizing military deterrence, using coast guard enforcement for quasi-blockades, applying precise economic pressure, and waging a "confidence war" against Taiwanese society.

China's true objective is an "indirect veto" over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, forcing Washington to consider Beijing's reactions before making decisions. This can be achieved not through invasion, but by normalizing military deterrence, using coast guard enforcement for quasi-blockades, applying precise economic pressure, and waging a "confidence war" against Taiwanese society. For instance, if China claims the right to inspect ships around Taiwan, forcing shipping and insurance industries to choose between compliance or the risk of severed routes, it gains practical control.

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The real danger isn't a sudden U.S. abandonment, but the gradual erosion of Taiwan's will to resist through disinformation and cognitive warfare.

However, "taking Taiwan without a fight" is not a foregone conclusion. Taiwan's democratic identity, defense capabilities, and international connections, along with congressional checks on the president and policy choices by Japan and the Philippines, are variables Beijing cannot unilaterally erase. The real danger isn't a sudden U.S. abandonment, but the gradual erosion of Taiwan's will to resist through disinformation and cognitive warfare.

Therefore, Taiwan's security strategy should shift from seeking stronger verbal assurances from the U.S. president to building its own capabilities and institutionalized cooperation. This includes redirecting defense procurement from expensive large platforms to dispersed, rapidly replenishable asymmetric forces. Strengthening resilience in ammunition, energy, undersea cables, and finance is crucial. Pre-emptively establishing mechanisms with shipping, insurance, and allies to counter quasi-blockades, and depoliticizing defense issues, are also vital. Any arrangement concerning cross-strait relations must ultimately be subject to the free consent of the Taiwanese people.

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Taiwan's security strategy should shift from seeking stronger verbal assurances from the U.S. president to building its own capabilities and institutionalized cooperation.