The 'Pershing Principle' Against SFTT Return: Not Part of US Military Doctrine, Says Report
Translated from Korean, summarized and contextualized by DistantNews.
At a glance
- The article clarifies the debate around the return of wartime operational control (SFTT) of South Korean forces, addressing concerns about the future of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command.
- It debunks the existence of the "Pershing Principle," a supposed US military doctrine stating that US forces do not take orders from foreign commanders, explaining it is not part of official US military doctrine.
- The piece details how future combined defense structures will operate, emphasizing that while a Korean general will lead a future Combined Forces Command, their operational control over US forces will be limited to specific units designated in joint plans.
The debate surrounding the return of wartime operational control (SFTT) of South Korean forces has sparked numerous questions regarding the future of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the command structure of US troops in Korea. One persistent argument against the SFTT return centers on the so-called "Pershing Principle," which claims US forces do not accept command from foreign militaries. However, this article from Hankyoreh argues that this principle is a myth, not an established US military doctrine.
The dissolution of the Combined Forces Command is not true. In February 2007, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the defense ministers of South Korea and the United States agreed on the 'transfer of operational control on April 17, 2012,' and the command structure was agreed to be a 'parallel command structure' in which 'South Korea leads and the US supports' after dissolving the Combined Forces Command.
The article explains that the "Pershing Principle" is not found in official US military doctrine. Instead, US joint doctrine on "Command Relationships" suggests that while the US President holds ultimate command authority, it can be strategically sound to place US forces under foreign command for specific military objectives. Historical examples cited include US forces serving under French command during World War I, British commanders during World War II in various theaters, a Brazilian general leading a multinational force in the Dominican Republic in 1965, a Turkish general commanding UN peacekeeping forces in Somalia in the early 1990s, and over half of the commanders of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2001 being non-US generals.
The Future Combined Forces Command commander from South Korea will exercise operational control over only a portion of the US forces in Korea designated in the ROK-US joint operational plan. The United States will continue to exercise operational control over US forces other than those designated.
Regarding the future command structure post-SFTT, the article clarifies that the proposed Future Combined Forces Command (FCFC) will indeed have a South Korean general as its commander and a US general as its deputy commander. This structure is similar to the current CFC, which has a US Army general as commander and a South Korean Army general as deputy. However, the SFTT return does not grant the South Korean commander unilateral control over all US forces. The Korean commander will only exercise operational control over specific US units designated within joint operational plans. The operational control of other US forces will remain with the United States. Currently, during peacetime (DEFCON 4), South Korea exercises peacetime operational control over its own forces. When a crisis escalates to DEFCON 3, designated ROK and US forces fall under the CFC's operational control, which is referred to as the exercise of SFTT.
The 'Pershing Principle' is not a US military doctrine or official policy. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff's 'Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations' contains no mention of the 'Pershing Principle' and instead presents the opposite.
Originally published by Hankyoreh in Korean. Translated, summarized, and contextualized by our editorial team with added local perspective. Read our editorial standards.