Transferring West Bank enforcement from IDF to police is a mistake without a plan - editorial

Defense Minister Israel Katz's proposal to shift the responsibility for managing extremist settler violence in the West Bank from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to the police is an idea worthy of discussion, but its announcement before a concrete plan is in place is problematic. The West Bank is an arena fraught with volatility and operational complexity, making such a radical change require meticulous planning.

Reporting revealed that Katz did not coordinate his proposal with several relevant IDF authorities prior to its public announcement. This lack of coordination has reportedly left some senior officials struggling to fully grasp the proposal's implications. Potential challenges, including legal questions, manpower constraints, operational difficulties, and possible High Court challenges, could easily delay, dilute, or even block the plan entirely.

The current system assigns the IDF primary responsibility for security and public order in the West Bank, with parallel roles played by the police and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency). The complex reality on the ground, where soldiers may encounter Palestinian residents, Israeli civilians, violent rioters, and bystanders, does not lend itself to simple institutional categorization. Katz's proposal does not eliminate this inherent complexity.

Recent events in Kusra, where settlers repeatedly entered a Palestinian village despite a closed military zone order, highlight the urgent need for better enforcement and clearer authority. The IDF's internal investigation into its handling of these events, including delays in evacuation and alleged failures to carry out missions, underscores the need for improved mechanisms. The article contends that governing requires the difficult work of making an outcome function, rather than merely declaring an outcome.