Iran's regime pays them to shoot. What happens when the money runs out?

Recent allegations suggest that Israeli intelligence spent years cultivating ties with former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a figure once known for Holocaust denial and threats against Israel. The report, initially published by The New York Times, claimed Ahmadinejad met with Israeli representatives abroad and was even considered for a post-regime change role in Iran. Ahmadinejad's office has vehemently denied these claims, dismissing them as fabricated "Hollywood-style" psychological warfare.

While the veracity of every detail remains publicly unconfirmed, the story's resonance within Iran is significant. It taps into a broader narrative of internal distrust and potential betrayal. Ahmadinejad himself previously accused the head of Iran's unit combating Mossad infiltration of secretly working for Mossad, along with other intelligence team members. The increasing plausibility of such accusations indicates a regime struggling to ascertain the true loyalty of its personnel.

This crisis of trust extends beyond the highest echelons of government. A former member of Iran's security apparatus revealed that he abandoned his duties during a recent uprising, citing threats and ongoing scrutiny from the IRGC. He explained that many of his colleagues remain at their posts primarily due to financial incentives. "Most of them stay because they receive money," he stated. "If it were not for the money, they would have turned their weapons toward the IRGC a long time ago."

This perspective shifts the focus from the ideological commitment of Iran's security forces to the financial cost of their loyalty. The January uprising demonstrated the regime's capacity for violence, with human rights organizations documenting widespread use of force against protesters. However, the machinery of repression appears to be a complex network, including the IRGC, Basij, police, and conscripts, whose continued service may be contingent on financial compensation rather than unwavering devotion to the regime.

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Most of them stay because they receive money. If it were not for the money, they would have turned their weapons toward the IRGC a long time ago.