Meritocracy at the base, patrimonialism at the top

Brazil has witnessed a sustained erosion of state capacity, a departure from its earlier, albeit incomplete, success in insulating public administration from partisan politics, familism, and patrimonialism. The introduction and spread of public service examinations were central to this trajectory. Brazil pioneered public service entrance exams in Latin America in 1936, with the diplomatic corps adopting them even earlier in 1919.

Historically, China was a precursor, implementing rigorous examination systems in the 11th century to ensure meritocratic selection. By the 17th century, competition was fierce, with pass rates as low as 1 in 6,000. The United Kingdom embraced meritocratic principles in 1855, with open competition beginning after 1870. The United States followed suit with the Pendleton Act of 1883, establishing merit-based access and criminalizing political patronage.

However, the article argues that public service exams do not inherently guarantee meritocracy or a competent state. Laws can coexist with patronage, exceptions, and fraudulent selections. Where impersonal recruitment rules are absent, a meritocratic bureaucracy struggles to exist. While exams limit patronage at the entry level, they do not control the selection of leaders or prevent family networks from capturing oversight institutions.

In Brazil, particularly at the subnational level where 90% of public employment is concentrated, patrimonial and family-based structures persist. These manifest in various forms, including cross-appointments and blatant nepotism across all branches of government, with little ideological distinction. Recent cases of governors' wives being appointed to audit courts exemplify this degradation. The current decline is not marked by the disappearance of public service exams but by the expansion of political and family networks that neutralize professional bureaucracies.