Hamas is Rebuilding, and Israel Faces the Same Dilemma Again

The question of whether war is returning to Gaza is a pressing concern within Israel's security establishment. Senior officers in the IDF Southern Command are actively redrafting operational plans for a potential renewed offensive, including the possibility of reconquering areas of Gaza not currently under Israeli control. This proactive stance is driven by the undeniable reality that Hamas is rebuilding, reconstituting itself, and rearming.

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Hamas is back. Not in the sense that it can immediately launch another October 7-style attack against Israel – the IDF still maintains control over significant parts of the Strip, including the buffer zone and the “yellow line” established after the war – but it is rebuilding, reconstituting itself and rearming.

Interviews with commanders who have recently served in Gaza paint a consistent picture: Hamas operatives are moving openly, humanitarian routes are being exploited to smuggle weapons, and the organization is slowly rebuilding its terror infrastructure. Furthermore, Hamas is reasserting its grip over the civilian population, and its finances, though depleted during the recent conflict, are showing signs of recovery. The pervasive weapon of fear, so potent against Gazans, is returning.

Hamas did not develop its capabilities for the October 7 massacre overnight; it took decades of gradual escalation, from rudimentary rockets to sophisticated tunnels and precision explosives. Israel, unfortunately, watched much of this unfold in real-time, clinging to the illusion of containment, a dangerous misconception shattered on October 7.

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Hamas operatives are openly moving around, humanitarian routes are being used to try to smuggle in weapons, terror infrastructure is slowly being rebuilt, and the organization is once again tightening its grip over the civilian population.

Now, Israeli officials are concerned that a similar cycle may be restarting. The dilemma facing Israel is stark. One option is to return to war, launching another large-scale ground invasion to dismantle Hamas completely. However, Israel has already attempted this for two years, employing extraordinary military force and eliminating thousands of terrorists and much of Hamas's leadership, yet the organization survived. The question remains: why would repeating the same strategy yield a different outcome?

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Why would trying the same thing again yield a different result?

The second option is to avoid further conflict and attempt to manage the situation. This involves maintaining the status quo, collaborating with initiatives like the "Board of Peace" led by US President Donald Trump, deepening regional cooperation, and relying on diplomatic and economic pressure to compel Hamas to disarm. The success of this approach is uncertain, as Hamas currently refuses to disarm, which stalls reconstruction efforts. However, this situation is fluid, and the demands on Israel will likely shift over time, with increasing pressure to scale back operations.

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The second option is to avoid another war and try to manage the situation – maintain the status quo, work alongside the “Board of Peace” led by US President Donald Trump, deepen regional cooperation, and hope that eventually enough diplomatic and economic pressure will force Hamas to disarm and relinquish control.