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๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ท South Korea /Elections & Politics

Revival of District Parties, a 'Reform Fraud' by the Two Major Parties [World Window]

From Hankyoreh · (34m ago) Korean Critical tone

Translated from Korean, summarized and contextualized by DistantNews.

TLDR

  • The recent revision of South Korea's Political Parties Act, which allows for the re-establishment of district party organizations ('jigudang'), is criticized for primarily benefiting the two major parties.
  • Critics argue that the reforms ignored demands from smaller parties for proportional representation expansion and the abolition of the electoral threshold.
  • The article contends that this move, similar to past revisions, serves to strengthen the established parties' power bases while creating barriers for new and smaller political entities.

The recent passage of the Political Parties Act, allowing for the revival of district-level party organizations, has been met with sharp criticism, particularly from smaller political factions. While the concept of regional party structures is fundamental to democratic systems worldwide, enabling local engagement and nurturing new political talent, the current revision is seen as a self-serving maneuver by the two dominant parties, the Democratic Party and the People Power Party. The core of the critique lies in the perceived betrayal of genuine reform: key demands from smaller parties, such as expanding proportional representation and abolishing the electoral threshold, were summarily dismissed.

District parties are necessary. No liberal democracy prohibits regional organizations of political parties.

โ€” Harnes Moesler, Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-EssenThe author asserts the fundamental importance of regional party structures for a healthy democracy.

The Constitutional Court's earlier warning that major parties would unlikely dismantle electoral barriers voluntarily has proven prescient. The revised act, in essence, does little more than solidify the regional strongholds of the Democratic Party and the People Power Party. These parties, having previously engaged in filibustering, found common ground when their organizational interests were at stake. A swift, behind-the-scenes agreement led to a rushed approval in the special committee on political reform and a quiet endorsement the following day. This allows the two major parties to legally employ paid staff for their district offices, further entrenching their local influence.

The results are that the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, with organizations and personnel in all 253 constituencies nationwide, will be able to legally use paid employees as soon as district party offices are established, further strengthening their regional bases.

โ€” Harnes Moesler, Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-EssenThe author explains how the new law disproportionately benefits the two major parties by allowing them to formalize and fund their local operations.

For smaller parties, the path to meaningful representation remains arduous. Even if they manage to overcome the daunting 5% popular vote requirement for local proportional representation โ€“ a significant hurdle โ€“ they lack the resources and personnel to establish and maintain district offices. The electoral threshold for national assembly elections remains at 3%, but the 5% threshold for local proportional representation persists, effectively barring minor parties from gaining seats regardless of their local organizational efforts. The increase in the proportion of regional proportional seats from 10% to 14% is a marginal improvement, falling far short of the 30% demanded by smaller parties, and its impact is further diluted by the non-cumulative system.

The system is open to everyone, but the actual beneficiaries are concentrated in the already strong side.

โ€” Harnes Moesler, Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-EssenThe author criticizes the reform for exacerbating existing power imbalances in the political system.

This situation echoes the 2004 revision of the Political Parties Act, which abolished district party organizations. At that time, the ruling Uri Party and the Grand National Party (predecessor to the People Power Party) colluded to eliminate these structures under the guise of addressing 'high-cost, low-efficiency' politics. However, they quietly reinstated similar structures through 'party member councils' the following year. This historical pattern reveals a consistent strategy: major parties manipulate reforms to consolidate their power, creating barriers for opposition and new political entrants. The current revival of district party organizations, therefore, is not a genuine democratic reform but a sophisticated 'deception of the sovereign'โ€”a calculated move to reinforce their existing advantages at the expense of a more inclusive and representative political landscape. True reform, the article argues, requires a fundamental shift in the system's underlying principles, not just cosmetic adjustments.

The revision of the Political Parties Act in 2004, which abolished district parties, had the same outcome: the major parties only took care of their own interests.

โ€” Harnes Moesler, Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-EssenThe author draws a parallel to a past reform, arguing that historical patterns show a tendency for such changes to benefit established parties.
DistantNews Editorial

Originally published by Hankyoreh in Korean. Translated, summarized, and contextualized by our editorial team with added local perspective. Read our editorial standards.